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COMMENTS
JOINDER OF CONSECUTIVE TORTFEASORS
In numerous cases the tortious conduct of more than one party is
involved in producing injury to a plaintiff or his property. Two or more
persons may agree to cause intentional harm to the plaintiff, or a plain-
tiff may be unintentionally harmed by one person as a result of an
agreement between two or more persons to do some reckless act. More
commonly, injury results from a single accident caused by the simple
negligence of more than one person; and in some cases the negligent
conduct of one party unites with that of another party unrelated in time
or space to produce a single injury. Finally, the conduct of one tort-
feasor may cause an injury as a result of which the plaintiff is subjected
to further injury produced by the tortious conduct of another.
If the injuries produced by the conduct of more than one party are
entirely separate and arise out of wholly unrelated occurrences, it is clear
that the tortfeasors cannot be joined in one lawsuit.1 Any common is-
sues of fact or law would be purely coincidental. It would not be pos-
sible to join, for example, a party whose negligence caused the plaintiff
to suffer injuries, from which he fully recovered, with a party who
caused new and separate injuries.
When the tortfeasors sought to be joined are true joint tortfeasors,
as in all cases where there is "concerted action," they may be joined in
one action. This "acting in concert" was the essence of a joint tort at
common law2 and is still recognized as a basis for imposing joint and
several liability when two or more persons agree to do some intentional
or reckless act which results in harm to the plaintiff.3 At present, when
the negligence of two or more parties combines to produce one accident,
most jurisdictions will hold the tortfeasors jointly and severally liable,
and allow them to be joined in one lawsuit 4 as "joint tortfeasors" even
though there is no concerted action.
A real question of whether or not joinder will be permitted seems
to arise in only two situations: (1) when the conduct of multiple tort-
feasors is unrelated, but a singular or indivisible injury results, and (2)
when the conduct of one tortfeasor can be said to be the cause of a
subsequent occurrence in which the plaintiff is injured by another tort-
feasor, and the original injury is aggravated. The resolution of the
question depends upon various factors, including the differences in the
statutory rules upon which joinder is based, the courts' interpretation
of those rules, and their resolution of conflicting policies of the law.
1See Annot., 94 A.L.R. 539, 541 (1935).
2 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 258 (3rd ed. 1964).
3Id. at 259.
4 Id. at 262.
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INDIVISIBLE INJURIES
The Wisconsin case of Caygill v. Ipsen5 is typical of the situation in
which a plaintiff is injured in one accident and at some future time is
injured in the same manner in an unrelated accident. In Caygill the
plaintiff received injuries to her cervical spine when the automobile in
which she was a passenger was struck from the rear by a car driven
by a Mrs. Ipsen. Almost five months later, the automobile in which the
plaintiff was driving was struck from the rear by one Thompson, and
she sustained injuries which were allegedly inseparable from those re-
ceived in the first accident. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff could not join Thompson and Mrs. Ipsen because, while
she alleged only one cause of action, there were in fact two separate
causes of action which did not affect both defendants. 6
The decision in the Caygill case was based, first of all, upon the
court's definition of a cause of action as "a grouping of facts falling
into a single unit or occurrence as a lay person would view them.
' 7
Under this definition, there was clearly more than one cause of action
involved in the case." Given the fact that there was more than one cause
of action, the court was faced with the question of whether or not the
two causes of action could be joined in one lawsuit. The section of the
Wisconsin Statutes which pertains to the joinder of causes of action
provides:
The plaintiff may unite in the, same complaint several causes of
action, whether they be such as were formerly denominated legal
or equitable or both. But the causes of action so united must
affect all the parties to the action and not require different places
of trial, and must be stated separately.9
While the court in Caygill pointed out that the causes of action were
not separately stated and required different places of trial, it made it
c'ear that its decision rested upon its holding that the causes of action did
not affect all the parties. The court went on to explain what is meant
by the phrase "affect all the parties to the action": "Unless the parties
are joint tortfeasors, the cause of action against one is not a cause of
action against the other, and each defendant is unaffected by the other
asserted claims." 10 Later in the opinion, the court stated:
127 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
Id. at 581, 135 N.W.2d at 286.
7 Id. at 582, 135 N.W.2d at 286.
s The question of what constitutes a "cause of action" is beyond the scope of
this article and has been fully discussed in a Comment, What Identifies a
Cause of Action, at 50 MARQ. L. Rav. 101 (1966). The question of joinder
of causes of action is discussed herein only in the context of its effect uponjoinder of parties defendant.
9 Wis. STAT. § 263.04 (1967).
10 27 Wis. 2d at 585, 136 N.W.2d at 288.
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The fact that [the wrongdoers'] conduct resulted in indivisible
injury to the plaintiff does not under these circumstances result
in creation of any relationship between them.
This court has consistently refused to allow the joinder of
separate and unrelated torts though their results do concur to
cause an individual injury to the plaintiff.1
It would seem that the Wisconsin court has taken a rather restrictive
view of the meaning of the phrase "affect all parties to the action." In
fact, it is difficult to conceive of any situation arising under Wisconsin
law in which joinder of separate causes of action against more than one
defendant will be permitted, for, under the Wisconsin court's definition,
it seems there will be either one cause of action in which all defendants
are joint tortfeasors, or there will be two or more causes of action in
which the defendants are not joint tortfeasors, and, therefore, cannot be
joined.12 While Wisconsin is undoubtedly in the majority of states in
interpreting the phrase "affect all parties to the action" to require a
finding of joint or common liability, courts in jurisdictions with similar
statutes have, in other contexts, suggested that a less strict interpretation
is possible.' 3 Their reasoning has generally been that an interpretation
allowing greater freedom of joinder of causes of action will promote
the convenient administration of justice and avoid a multiplicity of
suits.
14
Since the Wisconsin court has taken the position that an indivisible
injury does not in and of itself give rise to joint liability on the part of
the defendants, 5 it seems clear that joinder of defendants in the first
11 Id. at 587-88, 135 N.W2d at 289.
12 This is not to say that more than one cause of action cannot arise out of a
single occurrence, for it is clear that multiple causes of action in favor of
multiple plaintiffs may arise out of one accident, and the plaintiffs may join
in prosecuting their claims in one lawsuit. Wis. STAT. § 260.10 (1967). It has
also been suggested that more than one cause of action may arise in favor of a
single plaintiff when different primary rights are violated simultaneously. See
Comment, What Identifies a Cause of Action, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 101, 105
(1966).
"See, e.g., Kaiser v. Butchart, 200 Minn. 545, 274 N.W. 680, 684 (1937) ; May-
berry v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 100 Minn. 79, 110 N.W. 356, 358 (1907).
Nevertheless, no case has been found which permits joinder of defendants
who are unrelated in time and space and are not jointly liable for the plain-
tiff's injuries in a jurisdiction requiring that causes of action to be joined
must affect all parties.
The Field Code as originally adopted contained a requirement that in order
for causes of action to be joined, they must affect all parties equally. Shortly
thereafter the word "equally" was dropped. Blume, Free Joinder of Parties,
Claims and Counterclaims, A.B.A. Special Committee on Improving the Ad-
ministration of Justice, Judicial Administration Monographs, Series A (Col-
lected) 41, 46 (1942), cited in M. ROSENBERG AND J. WEINSTEIN, ELEMENTS OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 1148 (1962). While the Wisconsin court does not require
that all parties be affected equally in actions which are equitable in nature, it
would seem that such a requirement has in effect been imposed in personal
injury actions. See Whaling v. Stone Constr. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 113, 118, 92 N.W.2d
278, 281 (1958).
14Se. Ruediger v. Klink, 346 Mich. 357, 78 N.W.2d 248 (1956); Cooper v.
Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 S.C. 286, 136 S.E.2d 774 (1964).
15 Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 585-587, 135 N.W.2d 284, 288-289 (1965).
[Vol. 52
problem situation (that in which the defendants' conduct is unrelated,
but a single injury results) will never be permitted. The result, in juris-
dictions having restrictions on joinder of causes of action similar to
Wisconsin's, will apparently turn upon the question of whether or not
independent tortfeasors are considered "joint," or at least "jointly"
liable, when an indivisible injury is produced, or perhaps upon the
courts' decision as to whether one or more than one cause of action is
involved in such a situation.16
CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN OCCURRENCES
The second situation in which the question of joinder of defendants
arises is that in which one defendant's conduct not only causes injury
to the plaintiff, but also subjects him to further harm which results
from the tortious conduct of a second defendant. The Wisconsin case
of Fitzwihiams v. O'Shaughnessy'17 is a typical example. In that case
the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by one of the
defendants when it was struck from the rear by another automobile.
Because of her injuries in the accident, the plaintiff was placed in an
ambulance to be transported to the hospital. While the ambulance pro-
ceeded along the highway, it collided with an automobile, resulting in
further injuries to the plaintiff allegedly indivisible from the first. She
commenced an action in which she joined as defendants the drivers of
the automobiles involved in the first accident and the driver of the auto-
mobile involved in the second accident. The supreme court held that
two causes of action had been improperly joined, in that they did not
affect all parties to the action. The effect was, of course, to disallow
the joinder of the defendants in the two accidents.
The court's decision in the Fitzwilliams case was a refinement of
its decision in Caygill v. Ipsenk8 -in that if further definde what would
be considered a single occurrence or event and, therefore, give rise to
only one cause of action. In Caygill the accidents were separated by
almost five months, whereas in Fitzzuilliams, while it is not clear how
much time elapsed between the first and second accidents, it was prob-
ably less than half an hour since an emergency vehicle was involved and
16See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Taylor, 178 Okla., 21, 61 P.2d 574 (1936); Prairie Oil &
Gas Co. v. Laskey, 173 Okla. 48, 46 P.2d 484 (1935); Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease,
153 Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931). When the foregoing cases were decided,
all of them involving pollution of streams by more than one oil company,
there was a statute in effect in Oklahoma which required that causes of action
to be joined must affect all parties to the action. The court found the de-
defendants jointly liable in each case, and while in the first two cases cited
the defendants contended there was a misjoinder of causes of action, the
court made no reference to the statute in-holding that the parties could bejoined. See also Annot., 9 A.L.R. 939 (1920); Annot., 35 A.L.R. 409 (1925);
Annot., 91 A.L.R. 759 (1934); Lull v. Fox & Wisconsin Improvement Co.,
19 Wis. 112 (1865) (relied upon in Caygill v. Ipsen); Mitchell Realty Co. v.
West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W. 390 (1924).
'1740 Wis. 2d 123, 161 N.W.2d 242 (1968).
s 27 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
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the second accident occurred on the same road as the first. Neverthe-
less, the court concluded that the case was controlled by Caygill, and
held that the two collisions could not be considered a single unit or
occurrence. 19 In Caygill the court pointed out that sequential events
would be considered a single occurrence only when there is an insig-
nificant time lapse between them, and used the example of a chain re-
action accident 0 In Fitzwilliams it was indicated that a chain reaction
accident is the only situation which will be considered to constitute a
single occurrence or event. The court stated,
There may be a situation where the acts are consecutive and
closely enough related in time sequence to constitute one event
and therefore permit a proper joinder of causes in action, but
such is not the case now before us. 21
The above statement is confusing in that the court discusses a joinder
of causes of action where the acts are closely enough related to con-
stitute one event. It is clear that if they do constitute one event, there
is only one "cause of action" in the context in which the court discussed
it.-2 The plaintiff in Fitzwilliams pleaded the matter as a single cause
of action,23 but the question agreed upon in the briefs on appeal was
whether or not two causes of action had been improperly joined.24 It
seems clear that in Fitzwilliams, as in Caygill, that question could be
reached only after a determination was made that more than one cause
of action existed.
While the opinion in the Fitzwilliams case is somewhat confusing,
it is clear that the court concluded that there were two causes of ac-
tion and that they could not be joined. Assuming, arguendo, that there
were two "'causes of action,' 25 the question arises as to whether joinder
of the causes of action (and, therefore, of parties defendant) should
have been permitted. The court based its refusal to permit joinder of the
causes of action on the same ground that it did in Caygill v. Ipsen.
namely that the causes of action did not affect all the parties who had
been joined as defendants.2 6 The court did not, however, discuss in
any detail the question of whether or not all parties were "affected,"
but rather relied primarily upon Caygill and treated it as controlling.27
The court stated that the fact of indivisible injuries, alone, is not de-
19 40 Wis. 2d at 126, 161 N.W.2d at 244.
20 27 Wis. 2d at 586, 135 N.W.2d at 289.
21 40 Wis. 2d at 126, 161 N.W.2d at 244.
22 Caygill v. lpsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
23 Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 102, Fitzwilliaims v. O'Shaughnessy, 40 Wis.
2d 123, 161 N.W.2d 242 (1968).
24 Brief for Appellants at 3, Brief for Respondents at 2. While the case involved
a derivative "cause of action," its joinder was not in issue.
25 Cf. Comment, What Identifies a Cause of Action, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 101 (1966).
26 40 Wis. 2d at 125, 126, 161 N.W.2d at 243, 244.
27 Id. at 126, 161 N.W.2d at 244.
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cisive as to the joinder of causes of action.28 That this is the rule in
Wisconsin was firmly established in the Caygill case.
The Caygill case also made clear, however, that joint tortfeasors
may always be joined "since their responsibility to the defendant would
be identical." 29 Nevertheless, the Wisconsin court has made a distinc-
tion between "joint tortfeasors" and consecutive tortfeasors who are
"jointly and severally liable." The question generally arises when a
plaintiff has suffered some injury as the result of the negligence of an-
other, seeks medical attention, and sustains further injury at the hands
of a negligent physician or surgeon.30 In any such case, the first tort-
feasor is liable to the plaintiff for all of his damages even though the
negligent doctor contributed to them, while the doctor is liable only for
the damage he produced. 31 If, however, the plaintiff's injuries are in-
separable and both the original wrongdoer and the physician "as con-
secutive tort-feasors contributed to the single injury, the liability would
be joint and several, and each would be responsible for the entire
amount of the damages resulting from the single injury."32 justice
Currie has pointed out:
[The original tortfeasor] and the defendant physicians are not
joint tort-feasors but consecutive tort-feasors. Nevertheless, as
to part of plaintiff's damages there may be joint liability, and
this is regardless of whether the damages caused by [the original
tortfeasor], as distinguished from those resulting from the al-
leged malpractice, are capable of separate ascertainment or are
indivisible. This joint liability extends to any damages which
may have been caused by the defendant physicians' act of mal-
practice in enhancing the original injuries sustained as the result
of [the original tortfeasor's] alleged negligence because of the
fact that [the original tortfeasor, as well as the defendant] physi-
cians, is liable for the same.
33
It seems, therefore, that the court's position in refusing to allow joinder
in these situations is untenable, in that the court's reasoning behind
permitting joinder of defendants who are "joint tortfeasors" is that
"their responsibility to the defendant would be identical." 34 Neverthe-
less, the court indicated in Caygill that malpractice cases and others like
them do not give rise to a right of joinder.3 The court pointed out
28 Id. at 127, 161 N.W.2d at 244.
20 27 Wis. 2d at 585, 135 N.W.2d at 288.
30 See Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958); Bolick v. Gal-
lagher, 268 Wis. 421, 67 N.W.2d 860 (1955).
31 Fisher v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 60, 180 N.W.
269, 270 (1920) ; Selleck v. City of Janesville, 100 Wis. 157, 163-164, 75 N.W.
975, 976-977 (1898).
32 Bolick v. Gallagher, 268 Wis. 421, 427, 67 N.W.2d 860, 863 (1955).
33 Id. at 428, 67 N.W.2d at 864.
34 Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 585, 135 N.W.2d 284, 288 (1965).
31 Id. at 587, 135 N.W.2d at 289. The malpractice cases are probably not dis-
tinguishable from cases such as Fitzwilliams, since both types are based upon
the same legal theory-that the negligent party is liable for all the conse-
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earlier in its opinion, however, that an impleader of parties (for con-
tribution) and a joint trial of the actions in malpractice cases (when
the injuries are inseparable) are permitted.3 6 It would seem that in
any such case in which the other defendant is impleaded, the plaintiff
may amend his summons and complaint to plead against such de-
fendant3 7 since both defendants are jointly and severally liable for at
least a part of the plaintiff's damages as a matter of substantive law. 8
Even if the plaintiff did not so amend his complaint, was not permitted
to do so, or if the amended pleading were defeated on demurrer, it
would appear that any subsequent contest would be barred on the basis
of collateral estoppel, if not on that of res judicata. It is interesting to
note the consequences of a demurrer for misjoinder to the amended
complaint. If the demurrer were sustained, the issues of liability and
damages would still be decided, and yet the plaintiff would have no
right of recovery against the impleaded defendant in the action be-
cause he was not permitted to plead against him. If the demurrer were
not sustained, there seems to be no reason why the plaintiff should not
have been allowed to plead against both defendants in the first instance
by joining them in one action It seems clear, therefore, that in re-
fusing to permit joinder of defendants in malpractice cases and cases
such as Fitzwilliams, the court is blinding itself to the realities of the
substantive law. The "causes of action" in such cases do "affect all
parties to the action," even under the restrictive meaning which the
Wisconsin court has given that phrase.
Since it seems clear that joinder should be permitted in the type of
case just described, perhaps it can be questioned whether this type is
distinguished from the first discussed-that in which the torts are un-
related except for the fact of indivisible injury. There is no doubt that
quences which his act causes unless there is a superseding cause of some
of the harm. Even in jurisdictions where foreseeability is an element in
determining the causation question (which, as pointed out in Fitwilliamns,
it is not in Wisconsin), there should be no distinction between the two types
of cases, since it could hardly be contended that one subsequent event is or
is not foreseeable as compared to the other. Nevertheless, as the respondents
in Fitzwilliams pointed out, joinder of the original tortfeasor and the negli-
gent physician has never been permitted in Wisconsin. Brief of Respondents
at 10.
36 27 Wis. 2d at 586, 135 N.W.2d at 288. See also Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d
465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958) ; Bolick v. Gallagher, 268 Wis. 421, 67 N.W.2d 860(1955).
37 WIs. STAT § 269.44 (1967) provides that amendment of pleadings is discretion-
ary with the trial court and the amended pleading must state a "cause of
action arising out of the contract, transaction or occurrence" or be "connected
with the subject of the action upon which the original pleading is based." It
would appear that an amendment of a complaint to state a cause of action
against an impleaded defendant who is jointly and severally liable with the
original defendant (for at least part of plaintiff's damages) would at least
meet the second test quoted above.
3s As pointed out earlier in the concurring opinion in Bolick v. Gallagher, even if
the plaintiff's injuries are not divisible, there will be joint and several liability
for some of his injuries. 268 Wis. at 428, 67 N.W.2d at 864 (1955).
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the cases are factually distinguishable, in that in the first type there is
no causal connection between the occurrences. On the basis of present
Wisconsin substantive law, they are clearly distinguishable in that the
court has refused to hold unrelated parties jointly and severally liable
even though the consequences of their acts unite to produce a single or
indivisible injury. Nevertheless, the Wisconsin court does permit an
impleader and joint trial in malpractice cases where the injuries are
inseparable.30 If that is the court's reasoning, it should be applicable as
well to cases in which the tortfeasors are unrelated, the only, distinction
being the presence or absence of a causal connection. Since it has been
concluded that joinder of parties should be allowed in malpractice cases,
it follows that there is at least some basis for permitting it in cases of
indivisible -injury where there is no causal connection.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Perhaps it is not fair to put the entire blame on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court for the confusion which exists in the area of joinder of
parties defendant. Wisconsin and some other jurisdictions are burdened
by statutes which, without defiining the term "cause of action," place
restrictions upon joinder of causes of action.40 Less restrictive statutes,
which permit joinder of parties defendant, 41 are left in the background
while the court wrestles with the concept of a "cause of action.142 It
has been pointed out that such'statutes may conflict.43 Given a clearer
rule, courts find little difficulty in permitting joinder in cases in which
it is desirable. A few cases which are similar to the Wisconsin cases
which have been discussed herein should serve as an illustration.
Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 insofar as
it relates to joinder of parties defendant, provides:
All persons .... may be joined in one action as defendants if
there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alter-
native, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants
will arise in the action.
In Lucas v. City of Juneau45 the plaintiff was injured when he slipped
and fell in defendant's store. After he had spent some 18 days in a local
hospital, it apparently became necessary to transport him to another
hospital. In the process the defendant city's ambulance went out of
control and the plaintiff's original injury was aggravated. The court
39 Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 586, 135 N.W.2d 284, 288 (1965).
40 See WIS. STAT. § 263.04 (1967).
41 See Wis. STAT. § 260.11 (1967).
12 Fitzwilliams v. O'Shaughnessy, 40 Wis. 2d 123, 127, 161 N.W.2d 242, 244-45
(1968).
43 Rogers v. City of Oconomowoc, 16 Wis. 2d 621, 115 N.W2d 635 (1962).
44 FED. R. C 7v. P. 20 (a). A
45. 127 F. Supp. 730 (D. Alaska 1955).
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held that the injuries were separable and that the store owner was
liable for all the injuries but the defendant city was liable only for the
aggravation attributable to it. The court further held that both defend-
ants could be joined in one action under Rule 2 0(a), 4 because the
liability of both defendants for part of the injuries arose out of a single
occurrence, namely, the ambulance accident.
The case of Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Beaunit M/fills, Inc.47 contains
what is perhaps the most complete discussion of a liberal joinder statute.
In that case the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held
that the plaintiff was entitled to a single trial against a seller and a
processor of goods. The court based its decision on a statute which was
at that time practically identical to Rule 2 0(a) of the Federal Rules.48
The case of Ader v. Blau49 was an earlier New York case which held
that a person who caused an accident resulting in injuries could not be
joined with a treating physician whose malpractice resulted in the
decedent's death. Referring to the Ader case, the court in Tanbro
Fabrics stated:
[T]he Court of Appeals expressed doubt whether the joinder
statute contemplated joinder in such a case, even if the section
were given a liberal interpretation. It went on, however, to hold
that Section 258 . . .a restriction on joinder of causes of action
in pleading, was a limiting factor in permitting joinder of parties.
The full effect of the repealer of old Section 258 has, how-
however, not been left to speculation.... [The Court of Appeals
held that the Ader case, supra, was a result of the pleading
limitation [as to joinder of causes of action] in the old, and now
repealed, Section 258.
... The emphasis in the legislative and decisional history is
that the joinder statute is to be accorded broad liberality and
interpretation in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and incon-
sistencies in determination."
It is clear that the New York statute permits joinder when there is a
causal connection between the occurrences, and a trial court has so held
46 For a more recent case permitting joinder based on a rule identical to Federal
Rule 20(a) and facts practically identical to those in Fitswilliains, see State
ex rel. Smith v. Weinstein, 398 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Cit. App. 1965).
474 App. Div. 2d 519, 167 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1957).
48 N.Y. Civil Practice Act of 1920, as amended, Laws, 1949, ch. 147 (now
CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y. § 1002(b) (McKinney 1963)).
49241 N.Y. 7, 148 N.E. 771 (1925).
50 167 N.Y.S.2d at 390-391. In Knapp v. Creston Elevator, Inc., an Ohio court,
in permitting joinder of parties defendant in an action arising out of two
separate collisions, recognized "that there is some significance to the fact that
the Legislature has repealed [a provision which provided that causes of action
must affect all parties].
"It is a fair inference that when the Legislature repealed this section they
intended to liberalize the joinder of causes of action and such repeal im-
plemented the joinder of parties." 13 Ohio Misc. 188, 234 N.E.2d 326, 32F
(Ct. Com. P1. 1967).
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in a case in which the plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision
and subsequently injured in an ambulance accident. The court stated:
Assuming defendant [in the second accident] is liable to
plaintiffs, his liability is only for the injuries arising from or ag-
gravated by the collision in which [he] was involved. The same
is true for the defendants involved in the first collision. A com-
mon question of fact exists to be determined at the trial as to
the extent of the damages suffered by plaintiffs in the first col-
lision and those suffered by them in the second collision.51
Based upon the above reasoning, it would seem that the joinder statute
should permit joinder whenever there is a common damage question
even when there is no causal connection between the accidents. Never-
theless, another New York trial court held that a plaintiff could not
join defendants in two accidents which occurred about 13 months apart,
even though he alleged that the injuries received in the first accident
were aggravated. 52 The reason for the court's holding is not clear, how-
ever. At one point the court said of the 13 months' interval: "In that
time interval between the accidents there can be no doubt that a clear
cut determination of the injuries sustained as a result of each accident
can be made."' 53 Such a statement would seem to indicate that if the
damages were in fact indivisible, joinder would have been permitted.
Nevertheless, the court emphasized the fact that the two accidents did
not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of trans-
actions or occurrences as required by the statute.
An examination of the reasoning used in cases from other jurisdic-
tions will serve to illustrate the differing interpretations given the
joinder statute in order to permit a joinder of parties. In Watts v.
Smith,5 4 the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile which was struck
from the rear in both the morning and afternoon of the same day in
unrelated occurrences as a result of which he suffered allegedly in-
separable neck and back injuries. The court held that the defendants
in both the morning and the afternoon accidents could be joined in one
lawsuit. Justice Black of the Michigan Supreme Court stated in a con-
curring opinion:
GCR 206.1 permits the plaintiff to join defendants when, as
pleaded here, there is asserted a right to relief in respect of or
arising out of the same series of occurrences, and if a question
of law or fact common to them will arise in the action.55
5' Wilson v. Algeria, 5 Misc. 2d 520, 165 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191-92 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
52 Cipolla v. LaFranco, 202 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
53M. at 338.
54375 Mich. 220, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
55 134 N.W.2d at 196 (emphasis added). In Ryan v. Mackolin, the Ohio Court
of Appeals, in permitting joinder of defendants in accidents which occurred
about five months apart, held that the two collisions constituted a "series of
occurrences" within the meaning of the statute. 9 Ohio App. 2d 74, 222 N.E.2d
842 (1967).
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The gist of this concurring opinion was that the court should not at-
tempt to decide any substantive question (with the necessary implica-
tion that it was not necessary to decide any substantive question to de-
clare that the plaintiff had a right to join both defendants).
In Sutterfield v. District Court,16 the plaintiff was involved in two
collisions which were unrelated and separated by about nine months.
The Supreme Court of Colorado held joinder proper, basing its decision
on the state's joinder statute which is the same as that contained in
Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 The court used
a unique approach in bringing the case within the provision of the
statute requiring the right to relief to arise out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. The court stated:
In determining the question, we point out that the claims for
relief asserted here arise out of a single injury which resuted from
the two accidents. Thus it is the injury which is the "occurrence"
giving rise to the claim for relief. Accordingly, in the instant
case, the right to relief asserted against all four defendants arises
out of the same occurrence, namely, the single permanent injury
which allegedly resulted here from the two accidents.58
The foregoing cases seem to indicate that courts are willing to go as
far as is necessary to give the modern joinder statute its intended lib-
eral interpretation. While criticism may be leveled at the reasoning of
opinions such as the one in the case last cited, the weight of public
policy supports the decision. On the one hand there is a policy against
over-complicating lawsuits, but on the other hand there is the policy
that related claims should be disposed of in one lawsuit in order that
inconsistent decisions not be rendered and that an injured plaintiff not
be denied recovery because he cannot prove which defendant caused
what damages. It seems that the question of whether a lawsuit will be
too complicated is best left to the trial court which has discretion to
grant a severance,5 9 rather than being decided as a matter of law by
the supreme court. A decision to that effect would be further beneficial
in that it would tend to expedite litigation and perhaps relieve to a
limited extent the overcrowding of court calendars.
CONCLUSION
Since the Wisconsin Supreme Court has seen fit to give present
joinder statutes a restrictive interpretation, a decision to liberalize
joinder rules in Wisconsin, if one is to be made, will probably have to
be made by the legislature. As the cases cited from other states illus-
trates, the desired result has been accomplished by a repeal of statutes
56 438 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1968).
57 COLO. REV. STAT. Rule 20(a) (1953).
58 438 P.2d at 239.
59 Wis. STAT. § 270.08 (1967).
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which place restrictions upon joinder of causes of action and substitu-
tion of rules similar to Federal Rule 20(a) 60 which permit joinder of
parties in most circumstances in which it is desirable.
THOMAS M. ST.ASSBURG
Wo FE. R. Civ. P. 20 (a).
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